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DISRUPTION TO DISASTER:
THE CASE STUDY OF FOR-PROFIT LEGAL
EDUCATION IN RIAZ TEJANI’S LAW MART
ANDREW W. JURS†
INTRODUCTION
Rarely a day goes by without headlines hailing new approaches
to legal education, from mild changes to major modifications to the
existing order. These new approaches range from minor tweaks to
major overhauls and, in recent years, have included innovations
such as formative assessment, flipped classrooms, two-year JD
programs, tiered licensing, GRE admissions, online education, and
refocusing on practice skills or professionalism—to name a few.
Our era of disruption is a time to stop and reflect upon an earlier
story of legal education experimentation, namely the rise and
eventual collapse of for-profit legal education.1 It is a story outlined in compelling detail in Riaz Tejani’s Law Mart,2 and one
which can be consolidated into a single question with many ramifications: how does the for-profit model affect the management and
outcomes in postgraduate legal education? It is a perfectly reasonable question, and one I myself asked many years ago while
interviewing for a position at a school managed by the InfiLaw
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1
Regarding the collapse and closing of two of the three InfiLaw schools, see Anne
Ryman, Arizona Summit Law School Won’t Offer Classes This Fall; Students Told To
Transfer, AZCENTRAL (Aug. 19, 2018, 3:52 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
news/local/arizona-education/2018/08/14/arizona-summit-law-school-wont-offer-classesfall-2018/988268002/ [https://perma.cc/7BRF-6MWF]; Elizabeth Olson, Unable To
Reverse Its Fortunes and Now Unlicensed, Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2017, at B3. The third school, the Florida Coastal School of Law, had been
been found to be out of compliance with ABA accreditation standards but remained in
operation. Lorelei Laird, Florida Coastal Still out of Compliance with Accreditation
Standards, ABA Legal Ed Council Says, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 4, 2018, 3:13 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/florida_coastal_is_still_out_of_compliance_aba
_legal_ed_council_says [https://perma.cc/5HXH-BL84].
2
See generally RIAZ TEJANI, LAW MART (2017).
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System.3 As I slowly came to learn, and as Tejani makes clear in
his work, the answer to the question depends largely on who you
ask. That does not mean, however, that there is not an answer.
Tejani’s analysis of for-profit legal education offers a cautionary lesson as we approach contemporary proposals for major
modifications to legal education. That lesson involved the failure
of the ABA to appropriately regulate innovations in legal education to protect students, faculty members, and the public at large.
Tejani is well-positioned to assess these issues. He was a professor at Arizona Summit School of Law, an InfiLaw-managed forprofit law school, from 2011 to 2014. His analysis rings true to me,
as I also taught at a different InfiLaw-managed school—Florida
Coastal School of Law—for two years from 2009 to 2011.4 For
those not familiar with this corner of the legal education world, it
may come as a surprise how the for-profit model corrodes management practices of the schools in question. I count three cascading
effects of the for-profit model in management. First, the for-profit
model permeates the structure of the schools to the core, affecting
their location, their size, and their faculty hiring practices.
Second, since the schools are structured to develop profits, this
prerogative inevitably leads to a decline in true faculty governance
as business concerns trump educational and pedagogical considerations. Finally, the business structure and lack of faculty
governance leads to very poor outcomes for students who attend
these schools, badly serving those students and the clients they
may eventually represent. Most insidious of all, after management’s decisions invariably result in terrible student outcomes,
management may cast the blame on the students themselves, as
at Tejani’s school.5
Tejani’s work describes the management practices, the lack of
faculty governance, and the poor student outcomes at for-profit
schools and ascribes them to a fundamental theoretical mistake:
that neoliberal economic theories in this sphere lead to systematic
breakdown through the conscious separation of risk and reward.
3

InfiLaw is a company which serves as the management hub for (formerly) three
for-profit law schools, two of which have closed in recent years. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text. Infilaw is owned by Sterling Partners, a private equity fund from
Chicago. See Portfolio, STERLING PARTNERS, http://privateequity.sterlingpartners
.com/#portfolio [https://perma.cc/4VSW-EMV6] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).
4
I interviewed for a position at Florida Coastal School of Law in October and
November 2008 and worked there from July 2009 to June 2011. However, I have not
met nor conversed with Tejani, nor did our employment dates coincide.
5
For more on this, see infra Part III.
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By exposing the fallacy of for-profit legal education for what it is,
Law Mart creates a compelling and absorbing narrative of legal
education and the failure of oversight methodologies, and it is a
damning indictment not only of the industry but also the accreditors who claim to regulate it. To those who have not considered
the for-profit model, who suspect there is no effect, or who are
concerned about the ABA enforcement of accreditation standards,
I invite you to read Tejani’s work. As to both the substance of
innovation as well as the failure of regulation, the legal education
community ought to consider the implications of this failed
experiment on our current era of disruption.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FOR-PROFIT
LEGAL EDUCATION MARKET
InfiLaw’s Arizona Summit Law School and Charlotte School
of Law have both closed in recent years, while its third and final
school, the Florida Coastal School of Law, remained out of
compliance with ABA accreditation standards for many years after
the law school crisis.6 Meanwhile, non-InfiLaw for-profit schools
have had similar problems, as demonstrated by the closing of the
Savannah Law School—a branch of Atlanta’s John Marshall Law
School—and the near-collapse of the Charleston School of Law.7
Under these circumstances, one may wonder why for-profit legal
education had ever been considered a good idea and why it ever
was approved by the ABA.
To answer that question, Tejani begins his book with a
discussion of how the ABA was reluctant to accredit for-profit legal
education at all. The President of the American Bar Foundation
at the time, Bryant Garth, described the reaction to the
applications for accreditation from for-profit schools as follows:
“[E]verybody in legal education pretty much, including me . . . did

6

See Laird, supra note 1.
Tyler Roberts, Savannah Law School Is Closing After Seven Years, NAT’L JURIST
(Mar. 23, 2018, 10:08 AM), http://www.nationaljurist.com/national-jurist-magazine/
savannah-law-school-closing-after-seven-years [https://perma.cc/9WCM-7WDR]; Paul
Bowers, For Second Year, Most Charleston School of Law Grads Failed the July Bar
Exam, POST & COURIER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/forsecond-year-most-charleston-school-of-law-grads-failed/article_45fcdd56-db7d-11e8a8bc-2f483d8d1986.html [https://perma.cc/U6R7-RT4J]; Orin Kerr, Charleston School
of Law To Close?, WASH. POST.: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 7, 2015, 1:29 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/charlestonschool-of-law-to-close/ [https://perma.cc/P58Y-HVHJ].
7
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not want the for-profits to come. We all thought it would undermine some of the values that we think are fundamental to legal
education . . . .”8 Garth stated that when the for-profits sued in
antitrust, the ABA was forced to “capitulate” and accredit these
programs, even if they did not wish to do so beforehand.9 For
Tejani, the capitulation of the ABA was indicative of a laissez-faire
approach of “letting the market decide.”10
Through accreditation, for-profit legal education donned itself
in the cloak of disruption as a group of “antielitist” rebels promising innovation in a stodgy world of prestige-obsessed academics.11
Viewed in their best light, the schools promised an innovative
environment with new technology in the classroom, new professors
with practice experience, and a relentless focus on student preparedness for practice.12 The schools also promised to reach out to
students of color and help remediate the lack of diversity in the
legal community.13 With those objectives, the ABA could rest
assured that the for-profit model would be one of “differentiation”
but not wildly inconsistent with the previously existing approach
to legal education.14
Even with these promises, the laissez-faire approach had
fundamental flaws from the start. Accreditation of for-profit legal
education, to Tejani, is indicative of a larger problem in which
neoliberal values of market fundamentalism, deregulation, and
value maximization permeate society in areas previously unwilling to embrace those ideologies.15 However, once the neoliberal
approach to legal education is adopted, the values of neoliberalism
warp the educational model.
Tejani explains that the for-profit model contains selfdestructive attributes that degrade and destabilize the previously
established legal education models. The core problem is the “moral hazard” of separating the risk of the endeavor from the profits
it generates.16 Just as mortgage-backed securities destabilized the

8

TEJANI, supra note 2, at 4 (second alteration in original).
Id.; see generally Andy Portinga, Note, ABA Accreditation of Law Schools: An
Antitrust Analysis, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 635 (1996).
10
TEJANI, supra note 2, at 4.
11
Id. at 80.
12
On the issue of innovation, see id. at 80; on the issue of practice readiness, see
id. at 63.
13
Id. at 16–17.
14
Id. at 5.
15
Id. at 5–7.
16
Id. at 5.
9
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housing market and helped lead to the Great Recession, the moral
hazard of profit and risk separation would destabilize for-profit
legal education at the InfiLaw schools.
Even before the titanic forces of the Great Recession began to
tear apart for-profit legal education, InfiLaw knew that selling a
message of profiteering and neoliberalism on its face would not be
a successful marketing strategy. In response, Tejani explains,
they reacted by creating a facade of culture-based rationales for
their model. These “mission pillars” include “serving the underserved, providing student-outcome centered education, and
graduating students who are practice-ready.”17 One can immediately see that these mission pillars directly explain the market
differentiation that InfiLaw sought to obtain, and they were
marketed as such,18 but to Tejani their true purpose was more
nefarious. The culture, he states, “functioned to hold back community reflection on the moral hazard of for-profit legal
education.”19 So while the mission pillar of “serving the underserved” sought to show outside observers the positive results that
disruption could bring, it served the inside purpose of showing a
socially conscious mission to investors.20 However, once investments have been made, the for-profit model, by its very nature,
demands “perennial growth.”21 The need for profit expansion led
to contradictions between actions and explanations, as when the
corporation sought new revenue from increasingly vulnerable
students but then used the “mission pillars” to remind its personnel that the “mission was ideologically praiseworthy.”22 Similar
dynamics affect the other mission pillars of student-outcomecentered education and creating practice-ready graduates.
Maybe, without the Great Recession, this for-profit model
could have puttered along without catastrophic consequences, but
even before the law school crisis it was clear that major fault lines
lay underneath the neoliberal approach to legal education. I can
personally attest to the existence of these problems, as my own
experiences at an InfiLaw school before the post-recession legal
education collapse revealed the irreconcilable cross-purposes inherent in the for-profit model. However, the weaknesses in for17
18
19
20
21
22

Id. at 62.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id. at 71.
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profit legal education would be dramatically exposed to all by the
reduction in law school applications during the law school crisis of
2012 and beyond.
II. THE “LAW SCHOOL CRISIS”AND THE
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE
Very few expected the rapid decline in legal education that
occurred in the 2010s, and once it started, no one knew when the
decline would end. In the 2010–2011 academic year, 52,448 1L
students entered ABA-approved law schools—a record high.23 By
the 2015–2016 academic year, the entering class had fallen to
37,071—nearly a thirty-percent collapse.24 The colossal changes
in legal education in these years altered management styles and
practices at a great many law schools, but the effect on the InfiLaw
schools—as documented by Tejani in the most compelling chapters
of his book—demonstrates the fundamental contradictions of their
model.
Like most law schools, Arizona Summit, where Tejani was
teaching, saw steep declines in applications between 2012 and
2014.25 In the years immediately preceding the downturn, the
school’s investment prospectus indicated a near-term growth of
the student body to over 500 students per year, a number described as a forty percent increase each year and “what investors
want to see.”26 To meet the needs of those larger classes, the school
made two major decisions with lasting impacts: it hired a cohort of
twelve tenure-track and permanent legal research and writing
professors in the 2011–2012 academic year, and it signed a tenyear lease for an enhanced location in the Phoenix city center.27
Instead of phenomenal growth, however, the next few years saw a
steep downward trend in the legal education market. Declining
revenues quickly led to major institutional problems.

23
AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED, 1963–2012 ACADEMIC YEARS, https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to
_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.pdf [https://perma.cc/24YZ-RJR5]
(last visited Dec. 26, 2020).
24
AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA LAW
SCHOOL DATA: CHANGE IN 1L MATRICULANTS, 2016 v. 2015 (Dec. 15, 2016), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions
_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_v_2015_1l_matriculants.xlsx [https://perma.cc/ANA9-V45M].
25
TEJANI, supra note 2, at 105.
26
Id. at 106–07.
27
Id. at 89.

2020]

DISRUPTION TO DISASTER

445

To understand the scope of the problem, it helps to understand
the magnitude of the decline. On the front end, total applications
declined from 450 in the 2011 admissions cycle to 262 in 2014.28
Simultaneously, more students who started at Arizona Summit
transferred to other schools, with twenty percent leaving at the
start of the slide and the number increasing to an unspecified “alltime high” the next year.29 Declining applications and increased
transfers from the top of the class quickly altered the composition
of the student body. The median LSAT/GPA for entering students
had been 148/3.05 in 2011; by 2013, the profile had fallen to
144/2.88.30 Even more troubling, many of the top students transferred to other schools, resulting in a student body with a
disproportionate number of at-risk students.31 These circumstances challenged the school’s fundamental model.
The administration initially responded with several modest
measures. First, to increase the number of students eligible to
enroll, the school transformed its Alternative Admissions Model
Program for Legal Education (“AAMPLE”) program—a supplementary program initially designed to identify low-score but highpotential students32—into an “alternative admissions” system.33
Meanwhile, on the issue of transfer attrition, the school added
procedural steps that required potential transfer students to meet
with administrators prior to leaving and sometimes prior to
applying to transfer,34 then emphasizing the “we took a chance on
you” nature of the school.35 Some would even deny letters of
recommendation to transfer students.36 Yet by the 2012–2013
academic year, these measures failed to reverse the negative
enrollment trends for the school.

28

Id. at 105.
Id. at 101 (discussing the twenty percent figure for the 2011–2012 academic
year); see also id. at 129 (“all-time high”).
30
Arizona Summit Law School: Admissions, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, https://www
.lstreports.com/schools/arizonasummit/admissions/ [https://perma.cc/MM33-3GW9]
(last visited Aug 10, 2020) (detailing statistics for the years 2010 through 2017).
31
See TEJANI, supra note 2, at 101.
32
Id. at 50–51, 183.
33
Id. at 51 (explaining that enrollment from AAMPLE rose from eleven percent
of that class in 2005 to eighty percent in 2011); id. at 55–56 (describing the use of
AAMPLE as a way to justify increased admissions and revenue); id. at 183 (stating
that the law school increased their admission of AAMPLE students over time).
34
Id. at 100.
35
Id. at 101.
36
Id. at 101–02, 168.
29
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Since these more modest measures could not reverse the
downward trends at Arizona Summit, the administration took the
major—and catastrophic—step of completely overhauling the
school’s curriculum. Tejani makes clear that the plan—the “Legal
Education 2.0” initiative created by McKinsey business consultants—never had the intention of helping students with their
educational goals or as future attorneys.37 Instead, the initiative
served two different goals, primarily to soothe investors who
sensed their capital commitments to the InfiLaw venture were in
jeopardy38 and, later, to market the school as different and
innovative to prospective students.39 With those purposes, the
mechanisms would never be as important as the perception of
curricular innovation; however, in essence the plan was to engage
in “course integration” by combining first-year law classes in pairs:
“torts with civil procedure, contracts with property, and legal
writing with criminal law.”40
Whether or not these curricular reforms had—or have—merit,
the story of the Law 2.0 initiative is instead one about the depths
to which InfiLaw management would sink to achieve the goal of
its implementation. Since the proposals were business-modeldriven, InfiLaw management recognized the need for a veneer of
faculty input.41 So the school created committees to review the
proposals, although as Tejani makes clear, these committees were
never intended to serve a role of true review but were instead
stacked with administration-friendly faculty and “noninstructional staff.”42 Meanwhile, as the committees met to discuss proposals,
the Dean made clear that immediate implementation would be
necessary: “Our public relations department is already chomping
at the bit to market this new program . . . .”43
What I found remarkable in this part of the story is that, while
facing a clear mandate from the corporate management of InfiLaw
to pass the Law 2.0 initiative, the faculty repeatedly expressed
misgivings about the effect of the proposal on the students.44 In
response, the Dean of the School made two ominous statements:

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 112, 132.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 128–30 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 131–32.
Id. at 121, 132.
Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 136–38.
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first, that even if the faculty voted it down it would be implemented anyway; and second, that the Law 2.0 program was the
school’s chance “to build a better mousetrap.”45 Remarkably, in
spite of the management’s wishes, the faculty voted against the
proposal.46
Those who believe faculty governance is an important value
will be appalled at what happened next. The Dean’s initial response was to declare the faculty vote to be an endorsement of the
proposal.47 Next, committees consisting of nontenured faculty,
staff, and academic support counselors “reworked” the Law 2.0
plan, although Tejani makes clear these late-stage changes were
“de minimis.”48 Most insidious of all, management manipulated
who would be eligible to vote on the proposal in subsquent meetings by firing one prominent critic of the proposal and hiring
several visiting professors close to the Dean.49 It should surprise
no one to learn that eventually the Law 2.0 initiative passed.50
Yet even after the passage of the consultant’s plan, InfiLaw
would continue to retaliate against those deemed disloyal. At the
end of the academic year, two additional critics of the initiative—
a married couple—did not have their contracts renewed.51 Both
were tenured at the time.52 The message was clear to all remaining faculty: “[P]rofessors felt disheartened that the most vocal
among them could be removed for standing up for students.”53 The
dismissals “meant that the security to write or speak out against
popular or executive decisions—even in designated spaces for
faculty deliberation—was attenuated . . . .”54
In the final coup de grâce, Tejani then notes that shortly after
the Law 2.0 initiative, the American Bar Association Section on
Legal Education and the Bar sent a site inspection team to his
school for a regular review of compliance with ABA standards.55
45

Id. at 138.
Id. at 144.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 150.
49
Id. at 150–51.
50
Id. at 151.
51
Id. at 157.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 173.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 186. At the time of the events in question, the ABA Section of Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar required a site visit every seven years. AM. BAR
ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2013–2014, at 77 (2013),
46
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The timing could not have been any worse for management, occurring only months after the Law 2.0 fight.56
ABA standards, familiar to most professors and all administrators of ABA-accredited law schools, mandate certain minimum
standards in areas including faculty governance,57 academic
freedom,58 “security of position” for faculty,59 admissions standards,60 and bar passage rate.61 Yet even in the face of the Law 2.0
debacle, the site visit team never raised serious questions about
the governance style at the school,62 confounding Tejani’s
perception that the school was “bound for reprimand”63 and
frustrating others’ beliefs that the ABA should have done more.64
ABA site visit documents are not publicly available, but the fact
that the school remained accredited suggests the accuracy of these
perceptions—that ABA oversight failed completely.
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/
Standards/2013_2014_final_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure_for_approval_of
_law_schools_body.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJP7-PYEZ] [hereinafter
ABA STANDARDS AND RULES 2013–2014]. Since that time, the Council has modified
site visit frequency to every ten years. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL
OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2018–2019, at 52 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-2019ABAStandardsforApproval
ofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-rules-approval-law-schools-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XPA7-NH8R].
56
The final and deciding vote on the Law 2.0 proposal occurred on February 26,
2013. TEJANI, supra note 2, at 151. The ABA site visit to the school occurred September 29 to October 2, 2013. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP: 2013–2014 ANNUAL REPORT 29,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/201
3_2014_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNM8-ARF5] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).
57
See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES 2013–2014, supra note 55, at 13 (Standard 207
required “faculty [to] have a significant role in determining educational policy.”).
58
Id. at 34 (Standard 405(b) required a law school to “have an established and
announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure.”).
59
Id. (Standard 405(b) required a law school to have an established policy on
tenure, while 405(c) required clinical faculty to have “a form of security of position
reasonably similar to tenure” and 405(d) required “security of position” for legal
writing faculty.).
60
Id. at 37 (Standard 501(a) required law schools to “maintain sound admission
policies and practices,” while 501(b) prohibited law schools from admitting applicants
“who do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing its educational program and
being admitted to the bar.”).
61
See id. at 19–21 (Interpretation 301-6 explained detailed metrics for assessment of bar passage rates, to determine compliance with Standard 301 regarding
maintenance of “an educational program that prepares its students for admission to
the bar.”).
62
TEJANI, supra note 2, at 186.
63
Id. at 177.
64
Id. at 186.
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As a coda to the story, I will note that the bar passage rate for
Arizona Summit continued to drop, as Tejani anticipated it would,
from 75.8% in 2010 to 27.6% in 2017.65 The ABA, in reaction to a
bar passage rate of thirty-three percent in 2016, placed the school
on probation in March 2017 for failing to comply with ABA
Standards on Admission and Academic Standards.66 In May 2018,
Arizona Summit’s bar passage rate continued its decline, clearly
establishing that the school failed to comply with ABA standards,
and so the ABA finally revoked the accreditation in June 2018.67
InfiLaw responded by filing a lawsuit against the ABA, although
that suit was ultimately dismissed in January 2019.68
III. IMPLICATIONS
By examining the business practices of the for-profit legal
education model under the strain of the post-recession bubble
bursting, Tejani explores the insidious effects of profit-driven legal

65

Arizona Summit Law School: Bar Exam Outcomes, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY,
https://www.lstreports.com/schools/arizonasummit/bar/ [https://perma.cc/B4H5-V8GB]
(last visited Aug. 10, 2020) (detailing bar passage rates there between 2008 and 2017).
66
Memorandum from Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation and Legal
Educ., Am. Bar Ass’n, to Licensing Auths. for the State of Arizona (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and
_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/March2017CouncilOpen
SessionMaterials/2017_march_public_notice_re_arizona_summit_probation.authcheck
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZW6-KC89]. See also Anne Ryman, Arizona Summit Law
School in Phoenix Put on Probation for Law Bar-Passage Rates, AZCENTRAL (Mar. 27,
2017, 4:54 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix-education/2017/
03/27/arizona-summit-law-school-probation-low-bar-passage-rates/99698686/ [https://
perma.cc/M2M2-FC67].
67
Public Memorandum from Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation
and Legal Educ., Am. Bar Ass’n, to Licensing Auths. for the State of Arizona (June 8,
2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education
_and_admissions_to_the_bar/18_june_arizona_summit_public_notice.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9GXC-PXJK]. See also Stephanie Francis Ward, Arizona Summit Loses Accreditation Approval, Which May Be a First for an Operating Law School,
A.B.A. J. (June 11, 2018, 9:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/arizona
_summit_loses_accreditation_approval_which_may_be_a_first_for_operat [https://perma
.cc/CH47-ZB8B].
68
Stephanie Francis Ward, Arizona Summit Sues ABA, 3rd For-Profit InfiLaw
School To Do So, A.B.A. J. (May 24, 2018, 5:17 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/arizona_summit_sues_aba_3rd_for-profit_infilaw_school_to_do_so [https://perma
.cc/KE3V-STTV]. The complaint is publicly available. Complaint, Arizona Summit
Law School, LLC v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 18-CV-01580 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/images/main_images/Arizona_Summit_ABA_complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3G5D-M63C]. The dismissal is posted on the court’s docket. Order
Granting Stipulation of Dismissal, Arizona Summit Law School, LLC v. Am. Bar
Ass’n, No. 18-CV-01580 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2019).
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education. In so doing, his exposé should serve as a warning to
future “disruptors” in the field.
In legal education, profit motive affects the core structure and
setup of the schools operating under this model. Incentive structures will differ greatly among schools imbued with a profit motive
when basic choices are made about the schools’ location, size, or
faculty hiring practices. Locations for a for-profit law school must
be underserved by law schools of similar academic profiles, must
have a sufficient number of working adults to consider advanced
training, and must serve a legal market of sufficient size to absorb
graduates of the new school. Thus, InfiLaw chose to establish or
buy schools in large cities—Phoenix, Charlotte, and Jacksonville—
without competing law schools nearby,69 in states with doubledigit population growth,70 and in states without lawyer saturation.71 Similarly, the profit motive affects whom the school will
hire and under what terms. Tejani explains that faculty at InfiLaw
schools would be split between traditional doctrinal faculty, often
hired on the national hiring market, as he was, and members of
the local bar as “teaching track” faculty.72 Since faculty on the
teaching track were not subjected to the same standards of tenure,
their positions contributed to what Tejani calls “managed
precarity”—a system whereby employees are loyal out of feelings
of insecurity rather than out of choice.73
In Law Mart, Tejani spends significant time describing the
hiring practices of the schools and, to some extent, relates these to

69
Of course, Charlotte and Jacksonville had no other law schools. Phoenix did,
with Arizona State, but the student profile of A.S.U. indicates it is unlikely to be a
direct competitor with Arizona Summit. Compare Arizona Summit Law School:
Admissions, supra note 30 (detailing statistics for the years 2010 through 2019), with
Arizona State University: Admissions, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, https://www.lstreports
.com/schools/asu/admissions/ [https://perma.cc/TB9W-GRYY] (last visited Dec. 26,
2020) (detailing statistics for the years 2010 through 2019).
70
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010
tbl.1 (March 2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W5XE-CFUV].
71
See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: 10-YEAR
TREND IN LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE (2015), https://noticiasmicrojuris.files
.wordpress.com/2016/01/national-lawyer-population-by-state-2005-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6Y4-8XW3] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020) (showing thirty-percent or more
increases in lawyers in Arizona, Florida, and North Carolina); Matt Leichter, Lawyers
Per Capita By State, THE LAST GEN X AMERICAN, https://lawschooltuitionbubble
.wordpress.com/original-research-updated/lawyers-per-capita-by-state/ [https://perma
.cc/KUE3-Y4Q2] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).
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TEJANI, supra note 2, at 39–40, 124–25.
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Id. at 28 (emphasis omitted).
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the instability of the for-profit schools, but does not tie these on a
fundamental level to choices made at the time of the schools’ setup.
I suspect this has mainly to do with his employment at Arizona
Summit starting near the beginning of the post-recession admissions slide in 2012, but I think it would have been helpful for a
deeper review of these earlier foundational matters as a contributing factor to later instability under the stress test of matriculation
declines from 2011 to 2015.
The law school bubble bursting forms the core of the book and
is where Tejani’s work demonstrates its enormous importance.
When InfiLaw placed their schools in high-flying regions during
the early 2000s, they gambled that those areas would continue
those growth patterns. However, the states where InfiLaw schools
were located—Arizona, Florida, and North Carolina—were three
of the most severely affected states in the country during the Great
Recession.74 Initially, the response of the InfiLaw schools was
similar to other schools, in trying to consider alternative strategies
to deal with the changes in the market. However, as applications
dramatically declined, the weaknesses of the for-profit model led
to a situation striking at the core of faculty governance.
The priority of profits over pedagogy demonstrates the
negative effects for-profit can have on faculty governance and instructors’ roles not only as instructors but as stewards. The ABA
mandates that faculty are to have a primary role in curricular
matters, and while that standard has been strengthened since
2012, the Law 2.0 debacle described by Tejani in Law Mart
violates any standard the ABA could have in the area. InfiLaw
management decided that to show market differentiation and to
attract applicants, they would institute curricular reform created
by management consulting giant McKinsey and Company.75 The
faculty objected, having serious concerns about the effect of the
changes on students, and bravely voted down the changes two
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See Ana Swanson, They’re Some of the Unluckiest Places in America—and May
Confirm What’s Wrong with the Economy, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/23/the-most-unlucky-placesin-america/ [https://perma.cc/N82A-RVUB] (citing Florida and Arizona as states with
the highest negative impact on employment from the Great Recession); Ronald
Brownstein & Scott Bland, Obama’s Key States Are Among the Hardest Hit by
Recession, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2011/09/obamas-key-states-are-among-the-hardest-hit-by-recession/245948/ [https://
perma.cc/D5QW-P9CW] (citing Arizona and Florida as two of the four states hit
hardest by the recession).
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separate times.76 Yet in response to faculty opposition, management reacted not with humility and introspection but with
vindictiveness and manipulation. They fired faculty who spoke
out against the change.77 They told the faculty that InfiLaw would
impose the change whether or not they passed the proposal.78
They made clear that votes would continue until passage occurred.79 Finally, management manipulated the number of eligible voters by hiring additional voting faculty on temporary
contracts.80 In the end, Law 2.0 passed.
By tying this narrative to the weaknesses of faculty governance at Arizona Summit and the failures of ABA oversight
generally, Tejani serves up a chilling reminder of the importance
of these abstract principles for all of legal education. I can find no
more damning indictment of ABA oversight than his astonishment
that, mere months after the Law 2.0 debacle, ABA inspection
teams visited Arizona Summit and never commented on the issue
at all!81 Considering the shocking failure of the ABA to intervene,
they too must share some of the blame for negative effects
continuing after the site visit.
The final effect of for-profit governance of the InfiLaw schools
involves the outcomes for the students who enrolled. It cannot
surprise anyone to learn that a school more concerned about
marketing than sound pedagogy,82 about meeting investors’
expectations rather than students’ needs,83 and about enrollment
numbers rather than enrolling students’ credentials84 would run
into major problems in the post-recession legal education collapse.
From the high point of 2010–2011, enrollment at Arizona Summit
declined 42%, from 450 to 262, while the academic profile changed
from a median LSAT/GPA of 148/3.05 to 144/2.88.85 The problem
with short-sighted admissions policies is their latency period
which, by the nature of law school curricula, delays negative
outcomes. Since an entering class will usually take three years to
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complete the program of study, bar results fall in response to
altered entrance credentials after several years. This is exactly
what happened at Arizona Summit. Starting with a bar pass rate
of nearly seventy-six percent in 2010, the pass rate for graduates
of Arizona Summit dropped below fifty percent in 2015—exactly
three years after the 2012 admissions cycle started the postrecession enrollment collapse.86 The the bar exam pass rate fell to
the mid-twenties in 2017, and was 20.4% around the time of the
accreditation revocation in 2018.87 InfiLaw will tell anyone that
“ultimate bar pass” is the statistic here that matters, in that all
one needs to know is whether a student ever finally passes a bar
exam.88 This is another self-justifying talking point to obfuscate
the truth, which is that the profit motive led the school to admit
students who could not pass the bar, and they did not pass the
bar.89
Tejani’s treatment of the bar pass issue in Law Mart could
have been greater, although he connects it to the problem of neoliberal management of education since, in a for-profit educational
model, the risk and reward will always be separate—risk for the
student, reward for management.90 Had the manuscript of Law
86

Arizona Summit Law School: Bar Exam Outcomes, supra note 65 (detailing
statistics for the years 2008 through 2018).
87
Comm. on Examinations, July 2018 Examination Results, ARIZ. SUP. CT.,
https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/26/admis/Stats/July2018ArizonaUBEStatisticsfinal
20181031.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6NA-S5EU] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). Postrevocation statistics show continued decline, as the pass rate fell to 10.5% for the July
2019 examination and 3.03% for the February 2020 test. Comm. on Examinations,
July 2019 Examination Results, ARIZ. SUP. CT., https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/
26/admis/2019/AZUBE_719StatsRevised.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAK9-C7AL] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020); Comm. on Examination, February 2020 Examination Results,
ARIZ. SUP. CT., https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/26/admis/Stats/AZUBE_220Stats.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MTU-5FC4] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).
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Mart been completed a year later than it was, I suspect that he
would have spent more time here, mainly because this issue is the
one that finally resulted in ABA attention: the ABA revoked
Summit’s accreditation in July 2018.91 But whether or not the
book follows the story to its end, it highlights the disastrous
consequences of for-profit management for those least able to
afford them.
I will note one final irony, one which leapt off of the page at
me when I read it because it seemed to summarize the InfiLaw
ethos. In his conclusion, Tejani explains InfiLaw’s greatest trick
of all: to cast the failure of students to obtain jobs as a matter of
“personal responsibility” rather than any “structural” forces or
“disadvantage” in play.92 Having read the first seven chapters of
the book, anyone would conclude the “blame the victim” mentality
is morally bankrupt and reprehensible. For InfiLaw, however, it
is entirely consistent with its neoliberal approach to education—
privatized gains from risk shifting to the individual—and explains
perfectly why for-profit has no place in legal education.
CONCLUSION
Law Mart is an engaging read about an important story
involving the risk and collapse of for-profit legal education. Tying
the rise of proprietary education to neoliberal corporate practices,
Tejani shows why the schools were structured the way they are
and why, within those structures, the seeds of their destruction
had already been planted. Anyone who has followed the ups and
downs of legal education in the 2010s would be interested in
learning about the impact of the recession on these schools.
More importantly, the book also shows why they lasted as long
as they did, mainly because of ABA acquiescence. Months after
the Law 2.0 debacle, the ABA council had a perfect opportunity to
shift management practices of Arizona Summit by threatening
sanctions for obvious noncompliance with ABA standards on
admissions and faculty governance. Yet the ABA did nothing. Its
failure to engage in real oversight made a mockery of the rules,
and real people—students, faculty, and the public—got hurt in the
process.
As legal education considers the next great wave of innovation
and change, we should all keep in mind this lesson, and remain
91
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diligent so that it does not occur again. Tejani brought this lesserknown but important story to light and deserves great credit for
doing so.

